Sent: 04 October 2002 23:04
Subject: IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Case no: 2200894/1999

LONDON NORTH Case no: 220157211999

B E T W E E N:

MS M C SOLOMON

Applicant

- and -

MANUFACTURING, SCIENCE & FINANCE

TRADE UNION

(MSF)Respondent

WITNESS STATEMENT OF

MARCIA SOLOMON

 

 

I, MARCIA SOLOMON will say as follows.

1. I worked for the Respondent, MSF, from 1996 until my summary dismissal on 1st December 1999, spending the majority of my time working in the Finance Department. The reason for my dismissal was described by MSF as being "gross industrial misconduct".

2. When I was dismissed, I was told that, by making unsubstantiated allegations about financial impropriety taking place at the highest level within MSF, I had breached the trust and confidence expected of a member of staff and had brought MSF into disrepute. By contrast, I will say that the primary reason for my dismissal was that I had "blown the whistle" on this financial impropriety, specifically because I had alleged it was being perpetrated by Roger Lyons, the General Secretary, and Nelson Mendes, the Head of Finance

3. In particular, I will say that I made a disclosure of certain information, being information that I reasonably believed showed that both Mr Lyons and Mr Mendes were acting unlawfully. In making my disclosure to an appropriate person, the Assistant General Secretary John Chowcat (whose employment has also now terminated), I acted in good faith and without any desire for personal gain.

Background

4. After graduation, I was employed in a number of temporary positions, including a three-week stint with MSF in the summer of 1991. 1 did some work for Nelson Mendes on that occasion. After holding positions with other employers, I returned to MSF on a temporary contract in August 1996. 1 initially worked as a secretarial assistant to John Barnes, the National Secretary for the Craft Sector, who is now retired.

5. Towards the end of 1996, 1 learned that a permanent position - as Nelson's secretarial assistant - might become available. I recall that it was advertised on the union's internal e-mail system. Then, at MSF's 1996 Christmas party, Nelson approached me directly to ask if I would apply for it. He bought me a drink and told me that, out of all the temporary assistants with whom he had worked over the years, I had been the best.

6. At some point in January 1997, both Nelson and Coreen Nugent, a personnel officer, interviewed me for the position of his secretarial assistant. The job was offered to me and a letter of appointment issued towards the end of the month. I also received a list of my duties. I was now on a permanent contract and began work on 10th February 1997. My gross annual salary at the time was just under £18,000.

My Job Duties

7. In the context of my complaint to this Tribunal, one of the most important duties I performed for Nelson was to open and read all his (and the Department's) incoming mail, which I would then date-stamp, prioritise and distribute so that appropriate action could be taken. In this way, all correspondence on matters of Finance would come first to me. This would include expense claim forms from staff, officers and MSF members (known as lay members), letters from MSF's bankers, bills from firms of solicitors, and so on. I would open each item of mail and read it in order to decide what priority should be allocated to it.

8. Some documents I would hand immediately to Nelson. Other documents would be passed on to other staff members working in the Department. My varied job duties therefore put me in a key position to observe the level of claims for reimbursement of expenses that were submitted by officers, staff and lay activists of the union.

Roger Lyons: Credit Card and Expenses

9. I believe that Roger was the only officer permitted to use an MSF-provided personal credit card though American Express. Everything Roger purchased using this Amex credit card would be charged to the union. Almost as soon as I started work for Nelson, I noticed the very high level of the sums for which Roger used to seek reimbursement and the unusual nature of some of the items claimed, about which I shall comment further below. My colleagues and I regularly had what I called "freak-out" sessions, whereby we would observe with incredulity the amount of money Roger was spending on his credit card, which would then be refunded by MSF without question.

10. Copies of most (but not all) of the information I ultimately disclosed to John Chowcat, as I shall later explain, is before this Tribunal today, including statements, expense claims and documents relating to unauthorised interest-free loans. That which is before the Tribunal is the documentation I retained after making the disclosure.

11. I shall deal first with the credit card statements. To my knowledge, Roger was the only senior MSF officer to have an Amex card issued to him personally, and he made considerable use of it. Once a month, American Express (the card providers) sent MSF a bill detailing Roger's expenditure. Roger would authorise payment by writing "please pay" on the credit card slips, describing individual items by reference to "sustenance", "hospitality", "transport", "journals", and so on. As I stated above, the bills would then be paid directly to American Express by MSF, without question.

12. I do not know whether the card had any limit but the average monthly bill tended to be very high. This was for a person who, at that time, I believed to be earning a gross annual salary of approximately £70,000, together with additional benefits. Roger was entitled to a good salary for the job he did, and I have no criticism of MSF for providing him with a credit card to pay for necessary union items. However, what caused me particular concern was that, on seeing the statements, they would frequently include expenditure on what appeared to be non-union purchases.

13. There would be large amounts described as "sustenance" (rather than "hospitality") and sums spent in local shops, off-licences and restaurants near his home, often at weekends or holiday periods. Following the disclosure of documents by MSF to my solicitors, I saw for the first time the report that John Chowcat had handed to the union. I can now see that this report helpfully "put together", in a much more systematic way, all my growing concerns about the nature of Roger's expense claims. In summary, I can say that, at the time of the disclosure, I believed that the documents illustrated that numerous items of questionable expenditure had been incurred and claimed back by Roger over a 1.5 year period, including:

large sums spent on what Roger would describe as "sustenance" rather than "hospitality";

sums incurred in takeaway restaurants and supermarkets near his home in Finchley, usually at weekends and sometimes on public holidays like New Years Day;

sums spent on office supplies and equipment for home use, despite such matters normally being handled centrally through the head office; and

large sums spent on petrol, mainly at weekends and purchased from petrol stations close to his home, despite having a car and full-time driver provided for use on union business. This was despite there being union guidelines on declaration of mileage. There were even claims for petrol he used during his summer holiday.

As I said above, I can now see that John Chowcat's report analyses the sums spent and claimed in a far more systematic manner than I had done at the time. It provides a much more precise and articulate picture of my concerns at the time.

14. Similarly, Roger appeared to have a relaxed attitude in his approach to the procedure for claiming ordinary expenses. He would fill out a standard claim form, listing in a fairly cursory manner the various items for which he was seeking reimbursement. Again, it would be paid without question and regardless of the existence of receipts. I recall that a vast amount of money was shown to have been spent on hotels and meals over this period, little of which was shown to be described as "hospitality". In some cases, he seemed to be claiming back unreceipted expenditure for food and drink in respect of almost every single meeting he ever attended, including meetings with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The same was true with the various media interviews Roger was conducting. One reason I found this all so bizarre was that I would expect tea and coffee to be provided at such meetings; I certainly would not expect that an individual invited to meet with the Prime Minister would be expected to pay for hospitality at that meeting.

15. I recall that, in most cases, the amounts claimed had been fairly small; there had simply been a lot of them built up over a significant period of time. In fact, Roger also claimed fairly small amounts - £8 here, £9 there - for many of the internal MSF meetings he attended. Again, while the occasional purchase of refreshments was acceptable, I did not consider it was appropriate for Roger to claim such sums for meetings where tea and coffee (and also sandwiches) would be provided anyway. I therefore formed the view that the claims were likely to be dishonest.

16. It is worth adding that the basic rule in MSF was that any item of expenditure valued at under £l0 would not need to be receipted, but that items over £10 would need to be backed up by way of a receipt. A potential way of abusing the system, therefore, was to make a large number of expense claims for sums just under £10. In that regard, as I said above, Roger's claims showed a suspiciously large number of taxi trips costing in the region of £8 to £9, few of which would be backed up by a receipt. The number of taxi trips appeared to me to be surprising because, as I said above, MSF provided Roger with a car and full-time driver.

17. I cannot comment on any motive Roger may have had for spending so much money on his MSF credit card and for making so many claims in connection with expenses. But I did suspect that he was acting dishonestly. I considered it to be a fraud on the union. It was probably in breach of his obligations under his terms of employment and under the terms of the office to which he had been elected. The effect was that it probably increased his gross annual salary by about a fifth.

18. However, one of the clear problems I identified with the way the Finance Department was being run was this: there were absolutely no written guidelines controlling appropriate levels of expenditure by the General Secretary - or other senior officers. I felt it was legitimate for me to have this concern because, as I will say below, I had become involved as a representative with my own trade union (the GMB) and so was concerned about how any possible financial impropriety might impact upon GMB members working for MSF.

19. I raised my concern about the lack of accountability with Nelson. Nelson, however, was always keen to maintain the status quo. Every time I or another member of staff would check with Nelson about the level of expenditure on Roger's credit card, we were simply told to pay it. He would not want a debate on the matter. The finance staff would issue the cheque to American Express and Nelson, who was the authorised signatory, would sign the cheque on his own.

20. An important point, however, is that it was my business to examine such claims and ensure the priority with which they were treated and distributed to staff for action. Initially, I had no great desire to confront Nelson, Roger, John Chowcat or anyone else about the manner of expenditure.

21. I stress that my concerns grew over a lengthy period of time. At first, I was reluctant to think ill of the General Secretary or any other senior officer. My concern was simply that there should be more appropriate guidelines controlling the circumstances in which such money could be spent and claimed. But, as time passed, and the evidence of unjustified and unreceipted expense claims grew, I became more and more concerned. Also, as I shall explain later, there were other incidents suggesting that Roger and at least one other person - Nelson - were acting without adequate control.

22. This growth in my concern coincided with my increased involvement with my union, the GMB. As I became more interested in the work of the GMB, which represented the bulk of MSF's employees, I also became more and more worried that such levels of expenditure might actually disadvantage my fellow members. It might limit the money that might be given to them by way of increments to their pay. I understood that, keen to ensure that there was minimum risk of MSF having troubled finances, leading to possible redundancies, other GMB shop stewards had previously attempted to raise (at National Joint Committee level) the expenditure habits of Roger and other senior officials. However, they had done so without success.

Nelson Mendes: Expenses

23. Nelson was - and no doubt remains - one of Roger's "right hand men". He was fond of describing himself as a capitalist, and clearly enjoyed the challenge of managing money. These were no doubt worthy attributes of a Head of Finance, but his approach to controlling expense claims was far from prudent. Although he was not particularly popular amongst the staff in the Department, his own favourite was Mehmet Mehmet, with whom he dealt personally on a number of matters.

24. I now believe that Nelson dealt with Mehmet because, since I had first approached him about my concerns (about which I shall comment further below), he had become aware of my own suspicions about him. This is confirmed in the full Fisher's report, which I have seen for the first time in the course of preparing this statement. Nelson had made clear at the time of the investigation that he had not felt confident that his day-to-day routine would be treated in a confidential manner. Mehmet let it be known that Nelson had told him to keep his own expense claims under "lock and key", so that they could not be examined.

25. The information I disclosed to John Chowcat included some of Nelson's own unreceipted expense claim forms - some of which had been unauthorised - and extracts from his diary, as selected from a period of eight months during 1998. Even though he handled the claiming of expenses largely through Mehmet and issued payment of his own expense claims through the BACS system, I was concerned that, in the absence of any third party properly to monitor and control him, Nelson might also be abusing the system. In my view, the documents I gave to John Chowcat confirmed this to be the case.

26. I can now see that John Chowcat stated in his report that Nelson's own expense claims during 1998 showed how he had claimed reimbursement for a large amount of money spent on rail travel expenses. Nelson used to insist that other members of staff use travel warrants for union-related rail travel. He used to say that using rail warrants was a way of ensuring that the person actually travelled, which prevented fraud. It seemed to me that he was not abiding by his own rules.

27. I was also concerned that he was abusing the system and his position of authority by not obtaining approval for some of his expense claims and making claims in respect of meetings that were not reflected in his work diary.

A cross-reference between his diary and these claims suggested that Nelson was submitting claims for expenses relating to meetings he had not attended. As his secretarial assistant, I knew he had not attended some of these meetings.

Requests to destroy/conceal financial records

28. My growing concerns put in perspective other instructions that I had received from Nelson to destroy financial records. I now wonder if these had been attempts by him to "cover the tracks", although at the time I had not questioned it. Sometimes they were documents concerning confidential packages paid to departing members of staff and wages reports from Nelson to Roger.

29. However, the most relevant to this case related to a document concerning a loan from MSF to Roger. In April 1997, Nelson had asked me to type out a "strictly private and confidential" memorandum from him to Mehmet, copied to Pam George, referring to "the sum of £4,000 as a loan" to Roger, repayable by monthly deductions from Roger's salary. I do not know from where the money for the loan came, but I was suspicious that it should be arranged in this manner. There was no practice of making interest-free loans to staff. Exceptionally, salary advances could be made, but they would have to be authorised by the General Purpose Finance Committee (GPFC). It was clear that no such authority had been given; the loan had been authorised by Nelson alone. However, even when such payments were authorised, payment would only be channelled through the payroll department and not the accounts department.

30. I was therefore suspicious as to why Roger should be obtaining money outside of normal routes. A possible explanation (which at the time I believed to be the likely explanation) was that he was trying to "keep it quiet". This suspicion was confirmed when Nelson instructed me not to put a copy of that memo on the "day file" (that is, the general file to which duplicates of financial documents and other relevant records are recorded). This was also contrary to standard practice. Instead, he simply told me to "get rid of it". I assumed he was concerned that it would prove embarrassing if it resurfaced later. In breach of his instructions, and because of my suspicions, I retained a copy of the document. It was subsequently included, many months later, in the information I disclosed to John Chowcat.

The Uni!y Trust Bank cheques

31. I shall now comment on what later became the most serious allegation, concerning apparent manipulation of union funds held in defunct branch accounts. I want to make clear at the outset that what follows was not the only allegation of impropriety, either at the time I made the disclosure to John Chowcat or since. I have explained in detail above that it was one of a number of concerns I had about issues of abuses relating to expense claims and unauthorised loans, all of which were connected. The fact that it became the most serious of the allegations should not overshadow the fact that all my allegations were important, otherwise I would not have travelled down this road.

32. One morning in September 1997 - I will not say the exact date, for fear that it may lead to the identification of my source - two documents came to my attention. I am not willing to say how they came to my attention or identify my source. Although it was some time ago, I recall to some extent the manner in which it happened and I have provided an account of this to both my solicitor and barrister. To provide any further information to this Tribunal in full view of MSF and their lawyers would, I fear, breach the word of honour I gave to the person who provided me with copies of these documents. I promised never to identify that person, as it would effectively end that person's career, and I will not do so now.

33. Unity Trust Bank was MSF's principal bank. My source explained to me that Roger had in the past instructed UTB to draw cheques made payable to himself and Nelson personally. He did not say whether or not UTB were otherwise implicated. Copies of the cheques (not the originals) were passed to me, although I am not willing to identify the mode of communication. The copies showed two cheques: one made payable to Roger for over £29,000 and the other made payable to Nelson in the sum of £5,000. I cannot recall the cheque numbers or the dates they were written or the precise format of the cheques. All I can say is that they were recognisable as cheques. Although there was a scribbled signature on the cheques, it was not a name I recognised.

34. When the documents had been given to me, my source said: "we've never had this conversation. Whatever you do with these is up to you, but you should know what's going on within your company". When I have since asked this person to co-operate by giving evidence to the Tribunal, they have so far refused, saying they would deny their involvement if asked. - I should emphasise that I no longer have copies of the cheques this person provided to me, for reasons I shall later explain. They formed part of the information I later attempted to disclose to John Chowcat.

35. In retrospect, I should have proceeded immediately to the police and informed them. However, at the time, I just did not know what to think. Although I was not confused about what I had seen, I was confused about what it meant. This event happened after I had been asked to destroy the £4,000 loan document, but I was yet to become fully alive to the abuse of expense claims. Given that Nelson was my line manager, I initially thought that I should raise the matter with him. I was so desperate that what appeared to be true should not be true, that I would have accepted almost any explanation from Nelson as to why these cheques were being paid. Certainly, I hoped there was an innocent explanation.

36. However, immediately after seeing the copies of the cheques, I sat at my desk feeling lifeless and empty. I remember the thoughts that were going through my head. I didn't know what to believe. On the one hand, my boss appeared to be a thief. I looked at it as taking money from the pockets of my members, which angered and sickened me. Bizarrely, one of my stronger reactions at the time was thinking this was unacceptable because I understood that MSF had only recently cleared their bank debts. On the other hand, as I sa id above, there could have been an innocent explanation.

37. I recall that the cheques were described as being drawn on two MSF accounts bearing the names "Daxo" and "Guildhall". These two accounts appeared on MSF Financial records known as pool statements. Every week, I would receive pool statements in the post from Unity Trust Bank. These would show the balance of account on each of the branches within the union. I deduced that the cheques might represent money held in individual branch bank accounts.

38. I was aware that, under Rule 42(r) of the MSF Rules, all branches have to submit their annual financial returns (AFRs) to MSF Central Office. If branches do not submit AFRs, Nelson is empowered to "slice" money from their accounts. I believe the money would normally be taken from the branch accounts and put back into the union's general funds. In the Finance Department, the period we used to call "AFR time" runs from December of one year to March of the next. There are hundreds of MSF branches across the country. Inevitably, therefore, some neglect to submit their AFRs and then Nelson chooses how much he wishes to slice from their accounts. Such slicing sometimes leaves the branch account barely functional. I had in the past received telephone calls from branch officers complaining about slicing and I understand that some even resigned over the issue. I should also add that the amount of money in branch accounts varied considerably. Many had very little in them, but some of the more powerful branches had accounts containing significant sums of money. For example, some Regional Councils' accounts would contain funds in excess of £l50,000.

39. By checking against the pool statements held in the Finance Department, which show the running balances in branch accounts, I was able to verify the existence of both MSF Daxo and MSF Guildhall. By then cross-referring these to AFR records and membership records, I was able to determine the status of these branches. I discovered that neither MSF Daxo nor MSF Guildhall had submitted their AFRs. However, neither had their money been sliced. Neither MSF Daxo nor MSF Guildhall were on the membership system, amounting to fairly strong evidence that they had no members at all and were, therefore, defunct.

40. It was not uncommon for branches to become defunct and, if this happened, their accounts would be closed or transferred. I often helped arrange the closing or transferring of account funds at Nelson's request. The pool statements illustrated that the total in each of these two particular accounts at the start of 1997, taken together, amounted to just over £130,000. This had dwindled during the earlier part of 1997. By September, the total balance in the two accounts had stood at around £60,000.

41. I accept that, at that stage, I had not seen any document confirming that the reason for the dwindling of money in these accounts was the fact that the cheques I had seen had already been cashed. Also, I never actually saw the originals of either cheque. However, another member of staff had seen evidence of the existence of the Guildhall account, upon which I shall comment below.

42. I then resolved to confront Nelson about the matter. When he returned to the office, I asked to speak with him. The conversation took place some time ago but I can recall parts of it. I started off by asking him whether he was busy. He said that he had 5 minutes to spare. I told him that I had seen copies of cheques from apparently defunct MSF branch accounts payable to himself and Roger. I told him that the cheques appeared to relate to accounts that had previously had about £130,000 in them at the start of the year, but now only had about £60,000 in them.

43. I do clearly remember putting the question to him bluntly - I asked him "what is going on?" - but Nelson put his hands in the air and said that he did not know what I was talking about. He said something to me along the lines of "It's a load of rubbish, you can't believe everything you see and hear." I think he thought that, if he simply dismissed the matter out of hand, I would forget about it. Perhaps this was because, in the past, I had appeared willing to destroy documents at his request.

44. Nelson made it very clear that our conversation was over; indeed, it had finished as quickly as it had started. Just as I was about to leave the office, I turned around and saw him looking at me in a strange way. He then did something he hardly ever did; he kept his door shut all morning. It was apparent that he was involved in private conversations. From then on, it was clear that our relationship had changed drastically.

45. I felt dreadful. I had a pit in my stomach. What if I was wrong? I wanted Nelson to tell me why I was wrong, to explain it to me, but he simply didn't give an answer. I then resolved to try to find out more information for myself. In a sense, I wanted to prove myself wrong. If I could do that, I would know that I should apologise to Nelson and try to get my relationship with him back on track. Later the same day, when Nelson left the office, I was able to obtain from the same source a statement for the Guildhall branch. It listed the precise transactions on the branch accounts, including cheque numbers, set out on one page. This statement showed the sum of money that had been paid to Roger from this account. It showed the deduction of the £29,000 figure, confirming that the copy of at least that cheque must already have been cashed.

46. The statement appeared to confirm my worst fears. The bitterest pill for me to swallow was that I was working for a trade union fighting for the rights of workers and its own members' causes and its most senior officers appeared to be corrupt. In response, I can only say that I did not know how to react. I found it difficult to know how to handle myself in such a situation. Instead of going to the police or confronting Nelson about it for a second time, I simply hid my head in the sand, as if I was in denial. I still wanted it to be untrue. I loved MSF but my faith in two of its senior officers was destroyed. I still liked getting involved in the activities of the GMB. Overall, I am ashamed to say that I was simply too scared.

47. My relationship with Nelson deteriorated. He became more aggressive in the way he instructed me to perform work. It was as if he feared that I would refuse to carry out his instructions and challenge him if he was not aggressive towards me. He would leave notes for me and any communication seemed to take place only on a "need to know" basis. If he looked at me, it seemed to be in a manner that said: "don't question me". He became a bully. For example, he was unsympathetic with me when I had an accident at work and when I requested a change to my working arrangements.

48. This was the most difficult time of my life. I think I was running from the truth, too frightened to confront the consequences of what I believed I had discovered. I felt sick. I felt certain I would be sacked if anyone found out - a fear that has since proved justified. I have no other explanation for my failure to speak the truth at the time, about what I had seen, other than that I was afraid to do so. I had purchased a house in May 1997, and I was worried about my mortgage commitments. For the next nine months or so, I threw myself into my union activities, as a distraction, and tried to put any thoughts of alleged corruption to the back of my mind.

My involvement with the GMB

49. In October 1997, the month after I had seen the UTB cheques, I was elected as shop steward on the National Joint Committee (or NJC). The NJC was the body set up by the collective agreement between MSF and APEX. APEX was the name of the staff union, and it is now part of the bigger GMB union. The collective framework allowed consultation on all staffing matters, negotiating terms and conditions of service, and representing members in workplace disputes. One of my witnesses, Catherine Wells, will discuss in more detail how the NJC operated. In February 1998, 1 was elected as branch secretary; that is, secretary to the APEX/GMB branch for about 167 members working in MSF's offices in the London Region. It is a position that, technically, I still hold.

50. As branch secretary, I would hold meetings on a quarterly basis, receive weekly reports and mailings from the GMB, update the members either at meetings or via e-mail, and ensure that members' details and requests were submitted to the GMB. However, what really interested me was my role in negotiating on the NJC on behalf of my members working for MSF. In accordance with the collectively-agreed procedures, I participated in regular meetings on the APEX side of the NJC, attending meetings as an elected delegate. The person of the management side with whom I negotiated was John Chowcat, who was both Nelson's line manager and the Assistant General Secretary responsible for all staffing issues. John was MSF's "main man" for negotiations on terms and conditions of service, including pay.

51. At first, I was a little suspicious of John. Until my election as NJC representative, I had not really thought that much of him. However, I became increasingly impressed with John during our negotiations. He was no pushover, and we engaged in frequent robust exchanges of views, often in raised voices. In fact, once (in January 1999), 1 almost had a stand-up row with him concerning certain health and safety issues relevant in MSF's Bristol and Southwark Street offices. My negotiations with John were usually productive, but he negotiated very effectively on behalf of the management side. Increasingly, he struck me as a man that could be trusted. In my opinion, John was a fair person who would keep his word.

Accident and subsequent return to work

52. In June 1998, 1 suffered an accident at work. It arose from an ongoing concern that I had about a lack of office space, about which Nelson had been unsympathetic. I injured my back badly and was off work for two months. I became less active and put on weight as a result. However, it gave me time to sit at home, to consider my position more thoughtfully. From an emotional perspective, this was a welcome period of stability.

53. After I recovered sufficiently to return to work, I tried to sort out my previous concerns about the lack of office space. After all, I did not want to suffer another accident. Nelson refused to see me to discuss the issue. This did not help my relationship with him. At a subsequent meeting with Nelson, Martin Goodson (from the personnel department) and Colin Adkins (another GMB representative), Nelson implied that I had to return to my old office unchanged or else leave the employment of MSF. Thankfully, Colin objected to his aggressive response and suggested that, until MSF could sort the matter out. I could share an office with him and Brian Harris, another GMB representative.

54. This was a very practical solution. The finance department was on the fourth floor of the building, but the lift stopped at the third floor. If I wanted to go up to the fourth floor, I had to climb a flight of steps, which I would find very painful. However, Brian and Colin's room was situated on the third floor, and meant that I would not have to climb any stairs. Accordingly, when I returned to work in August 1998, 1 began sharing an office with Colin and Brian. It was not until January 1999 that, at the insistence of my fellow reps, I was eventually moved to a meeting room.

55. Sharing an office with Colin and Brian during this period helped me to rebuild my confidence. They were also elected NJC reps, and they had also been concerned about Rogers rumoured expense habits; there were always rumours about the issue. Increasingly, I began to see the issue of alleged corruption more and more as a "union issue", something that need to be opened up and investigated, to see whether theft had really occurred. It was at this time that, as I explained before, my concern at the apparent abuse of the expense procedure began to increase into annoyance at what appeared to be an example of the union - and my members - being "fleeced". Yet, despite this, I still wanted to keep the issue of the Daxo and Guildhall cheques out of my mind. It was just too big an issue for me to handle.

56. Every little incident seemed to add to the impression I was getting that Roger was living the high life off union funds. There were all sorts of rumours flying around. One was that Roger's driver, Eddie, left him around this time, claiming the job was putting him out of pocket, because he would put petrol in Roger's official car and end up paying for it out of his own pocket while Roger used the receipt to claim reimbursement for himself.

57. Even despite what I had said to Nelson before my accident, he continued to permit me to open his post. The tradition of the "freak-out" session returned. Colin and I would be incredulous at the level of expenses still being claimed by Roger, and I began to feel more and more that I should expose what was going on. All these apparently insignificant sums - although not insignificant to many of our members - were adding up.

58. At the same time, rumours were circulating about possible redundancies. At the NJC meeting in December 1998, John Chowcat and Tony Ayres had stated that a ratio involving staff costs against subscription income had exceeded the 40% level advised by MSF's accountants. There was therefore a concern that the redundancies that took place in 1995 would need to be repeated. It seemed to me that it was unsatisfactory for MSF to be considering making redundancies at a time when its senior officers were making such unjustified claims on expenses.

59. The last straw came in December 1998, when I saw that Roger was seeking reimbursement for the sum of £32.71 spent on his credit card for petrol while leaving Dover for a private holiday and a New Year's Day dinner costing £l6.20 at a Balti/Tandoori restaurant in London. I did not see how these could properly be described as union business.

The disclosure to John Chowcat

60. It was around this time that Colin mentioned to me that John Chowcat had been gaining interest in the rumours of expense abuse and other financial impropriety. I began to ask myself what I could do about this situation. Still anxious and nervous about the possible consequences, I decided I should communicate with John Chowcat over the issue.

61. When I was subsequently dismissed, I was criticised for making the disclosure to John. I am now informed that, in its defence to my claim, MSF state that my allegations were motivated by malice against Nelson and a desire for personal advancement because I hoped the allegations would cause the downfall of Roger as General Secretary and, presumably, his replacement by John. MSF state that I made contact with John because I knew that he would be predisposed to believe the allegations, because he disliked Roger. It is stated that, had the allegations been true, I would have made them to a "neutral" person.

62. This is not the case. I am not interested in internal politics. I simply wanted to expose what I knew, so that the truth could be investigated. I communicated with John for numerous reasons. First, I thought that, in order to protect MSF's reputation, I should raise the matter internally. Yet, when I was dismissed, I was criticised for not going straight to either the Certification Officer or through the GMB. I don't see how involving a third party at that stage would have been less damaging for MSF. Secondly, out of all the people to whom I could have made the disclosure internally, John was the obvious candidate. He was the Assistant General Secretary responsible for staffing matters. He was Nelson's line manager. He was also known for being unafraid at standing up to Roger in internal meetings, whereas others may have been intimidated. For that reason, I did see him as neutral. Lastly, because of my earlier dealings with him on the NJC, I trusted him. In all the circumstances, there was no other internal person to whom I could have gone.

63. I stress that I made the disclosure to John out of my own free will and without being encouraged to do so, either by him or Colin. There was no conspiracy to bring about Roger's downfall. There was no political desire to advance any particular MSF or GMB faction or caucus. There was no desire on my part to advance my own career - to the contrary, I was taking an enormous risk. I have gained nothing from this whole affair except misery. And there was no desire on the part of the GMB - as Tony Ayres (head of personnel) alleged - during the disciplinary meeting - to plot to overthrow Roger. And I categorically deny any personal involvement in leaking any information to the media.

64. I began to gather relevant documentation during January 1999. As the secretarial assistant to the Head of Finance, I naturally knew where the relevant documents would be kept. Had I been able to climb the stairs from the third to the fourth floor, there is no doubt that I would have gone there to photocopy the documents personally. However, to save myself from the risk of further injury, I asked someone else to do it for me. I am unwilling to identify that person, as to do so would place their career in great jeopardy.

65. The person took a great risk in photocopying, at my request, Roger's credit card statements, his expense claims forms and the loan document from April 1997. 1 collated all the information and, in the first week of February, while Nelson was on holiday, I placed it into two brown A4 envelopes. I considered that this was enough. One evening at the end of a work day (I cannot remember the exact date), I put these envelopes anonymously on John's desk. I was confident that he would examine the information they contained in an honest and fair manner. However, I still did not want to inform John about the Daxo and Guildhall cheques: it was almost as if I still didn't want them to be true, knowing that they would be dynamite.

66. However, I was still nervous about providing Roger's expenses information to John. It was difficult to think straight, and I kept worrying about the potential consequences of my actions. I then decided that it was silly not to be clearer about who had given him the information. A couple of days later, I telephoned him on his mobile. I recall that he was in Ireland at the time. I left a message on his, voicemail. I needed to speak with him anyway about an APEX staffing issue. He returned my call later that day.

67. John started by asking me how I was. After some initial chit-chat, when I think we spoke in general terms about him being in Ireland, and after discussing the staffing issue, I told him I was aware that he had received two envelopes. From what I had said it became apparent to John that I was the person who had left them on his desk. John described the contents as very interesting, and said he would be putting together a report on the information once he had fully examined it all. I felt relieved that he had reacted positively to my actions, but told him that I was scared that I might be sacked.

68. During our conversation, John wondered aloud how much information there was that was relevant to the allegations. I told him I believed that Nelson had also been abusing the expense procedure by making unauthorised or dishonest claims. I said someone would probably be able to get hold of copies of his expense claims and diary extracts. Having obtained this information in the same manner as before, I collated it and passed it to John during work hours. Even at this stage, I was still too nervous to tell John about the Daxo and Guildhall cheques.

69. I was thinking about the cheques a lot. I was still very confused. I was doubting myself: what if I was wrong? I went home from work, my mind racing. I am ashamed to say that, during the course of that evening, I got very drunk. In my drunken state, I resolved to confront the issue head-on. I dug out the copies of the cheques, the numerous pool statements and the statement of the Guildhall account and, in something of a mix between a blur and a blind panic, stuffed them all into an envelope.

70. I wanted to pass the whole matter over to John and to get the issue out of my life. The envelope was crammed, mostly with the pool statements. I addressed it with the intention of sending it to John's home address. I was not really thinking what I was doing. I should have waited until the next morning and taken the whole package to the Post Office to get it weighed properly and sent by recorded delivery. In retrospect, I certainly should have taken copies; but I can only stress how much I wanted the documents out of my hands and for the responsibility to be passed onto someone more capable. Now that I had made up my mind, I just wanted rid of them. I stuck a load of stamps on the envelope, probably less than I needed, and posted it. Although I was drunk, I do remember that I had to push quite hard to get it through the opening in the letterbox.

71. The next day, in the cold light of morning, I awoke regretting the way I had posted the envelope. I immediately telephoned John to ask if he had received it. When he said that he had not, I became very worried. By the end of the next day, it had still not arrived. I wondered if it had burst open. John and I became increasingly concerned at what had happened to it. We tried to track it down and were told that the only possible place it could have ended up was Portsmouth, the depot where damaged postal goods are sent. However, there would have been no way of identifying me as its sender. It simply contained the relevant documents and a brief note from me to John. Given that it contained documents identifying both MSF and Unity Trust Bank, I now wonder if the package might have worked its way back to either of those places.

72. I am sure that some will think that this all sounds very convenient, particularly as the key documents - the Daxo and Guildhall cheques, the numerous pool statements and the UTB bank statement - had been my only copies. But I can only state categorically that it is the truth. I can only repeat that it was a spur of the moment decision to take the burden off my shoulders and pass it to someone else. If I had decided I would invent this entire complicated story, I would have thought up a far better explanation for why such important evidence got lost.

73. I began to worry that some of my fellow reps were beginning to doubt the truth of what I was saying. But something unexpected happened confirming the truth of a key part of this issue: the existence of a Guildhall account. Joan Francis, a fellow GMB representative, admitted to having seen a document connected with the Guildhall account - my understanding was that she had seen the original Guildhall cheque, although Joan will give evidence on this. I felt that my credibility had been restored. I understand from Joan that the cheque had stuck in her mind because she saw the word "Guildhall" and thought it related to some sort of educational trust, because she wanted to study at Guildhall College.

74. With inadequate documentation to confirm the removal of money from defunct branch accounts, John withdrew his allegation in that regard and focused his report on the issue of expense claims and unauthorised loans. He presented it to the President of MSF, Dave Cooke.

 

 

 

Aftermath of the disclosure

75. After that, it seemed that nothing was being done. Word soon spread about John's allegations; indeed, there were numerous meetings and announcements, causing some confusion. Following a further delay, there began to be calls made for an independent investigation into the allegations. MSF launched its own internal investigations; disappointingly, however, these did not look at all into the substance of the allegations made by John Chowcat. Instead, the whole purpose of the investigation was to identify the person who had leaked the allegations to the press - and I was not responsible for this.

76. In my capacity as a GMB representative, I was frustrated that so little was being done to investigate the truth behind the documents. I therefore countersigned (with Colin Adkins) a document calling for the suspension of Roger and Nelson, which was sent to John. He was the only person who I thought would take the document seriously.

77. I was interviewed on or about 22nd February 1999 by Miles Webber, MSF's head of communications, and Tony Ayres, head of personnel, in the presence of Colin Adkins, who acted as my rep. As I said above, MSF at this stage appeared interested only in how the press had got hold of details of the affair. I was offered immunity if I "co-operated", which I took as an invitation to implicate John Chowcat in the leak to the press. I was asked a series of questions in accordance with a list set out in a document that Tony had before him. I did not see the list, and nor did I sign any document to confirm that the answers I had given were correct.

78. I was obviously nervous and fearful for my job. I was convinced that I would get sacked if the nature of my involvement was discovered, and I thought they might try to pin the blame for the leak to the press on me, knowing the difficulties I was having with Nelson. I therefore gave very precise answers to the questions I was asked, trying hard to protect my own position while remaining truthful.

79. The questions were put forward in an intimidating and vigorous manner. They asked whether I had personally photocopied information on financial malpractice. I denied this, which was technically true. They then asked whether I had personally handed any information to an outside party or spoken to the Daily Express. I denied this; again, this was technically true. This may seem disingenuous, but it is true: it was not I who photocopied information; it was not I who leaked any information to the press; it was not I who spoke to any outside body. Technically, my answers were correct. At this stage, I was far too scared and nervous about my position to be completely open about my involvement.

80. I was so concerned about my job and the consequences of my disclosure that John recommended the name of a firm of solicitors I could contact and who could help me prepare an affidavit. I thought that, if I gave MSF enough of the information they needed about the nature of my involvement, set out in a sworn affidavit, it would save my colleagues from facing further aggressive questioning. The affidavit was duly prepared and sworn on 5th March. I am aware that the offence of perjury that may be committed if a person describes an event in an affidavit that he or she knows to be untrue. MSF allege that I have committed perjury; I vehemently deny this. I have committed no such offence. I still stand by the contents of my affidavit even though, through their solicitors, MSF have now threatened to report me to the police and to commence a private prosecution against me. I subsequently wrote to Tony Ayres at MSF, submitting the affidavit.

81. MSF then appointed its own firm of accountants, Fishers, to investigate the substance of the allegations. Fishers have been retained by MSF as accountants and auditors for years, so for that reason they cannot be truly independent. It was at this stage that other parties invited the Certification Officer to get involved.

82. When Colin Adkins and I wrote the letter calling for the suspension of Roger and Nelson, we partly did so because Nelson was absent on holiday and we hoped that he would not have an opportunity upon returning to work to conceal any evidence of wrongdoing. However, neither Roger nor Nelson was suspended. Instead, Nelson returned from holiday towards the end of February 1999 and, a day or so later, I understand he was seen by a security guard leaving the office between 12 midnight and 2am carrying storage boxes.

83. I did not see this myself, nor can I comment on the contents of those boxes. At the moment, I will provide no further information on the identity of the person who passed me this information for fear of jeopardising their career. I have no evidence on which to describe the contents of the boxes but, given the timetable of events, I believed Nelson's actions were suspicious.

84. The whole process became too much for me and, on 16th March 1999, I went off sick. I went to see my GP, who diagnosed me as suffering from symptoms of stress. Over the following weeks and months, I attended counselling sessions, found myself frequently in tears and with feelings of sickness in the pit of my stomach. I experienced anxiety attacks and felt isolated and worthless. I had great trouble sleeping. I was placed on anti-depressants.

85. The situation was aggravated by news reaching me of certain comments made by Roger and others. I did not hear any of these comments myself, and so cannot give direct evidence upon them. However, colleagues of mine will provide evidence on them. For example, Colin Adkins told me of rumours that had been circulating; for example, that one of Roger's research officers had said that Roger was "going to get me", that I was "deranged" and that I had been "sleeping with John Chowcat".

86. I understand that Miles Webber also informed Colin Adkins, after the February 22nd investigation meeting, that I and others would be facing immediate suspension. I understand Colin took action that prevented a letter of suspension being immediately biked over to me. Colin can give further evidence on this. I also understand that MSF made attempts to analyse calls made from John Chowcat's office and mobile to me, in order to assess whether there was some form of collusion between us - even though such communication would often relate only to staffing issues. MSF have disclosed a document suggesting this to be the case.

87. On 16th April 1999, Frances Richardson, another senior MSF officer and the person for whom I was now supposed to be working, left a message on my mobile telephone, saying that she wanted to speak with me. I recall that this was the day that the rumours first started about John Chowcat's employment with MSF being terminated. I tried to contact her, but was only able to leave a message. Then, on 19th April, she telephoned me again, leaving a further message that she wanted to meet up with my partner and 1. Finally, we spoke on or about 21st April. She said that, in view of John Chowcat's "sacking", she wanted to discuss "where we went from here". She said something about making sure that I did not "starve". I replied that I wasn't going to be accepting any "pay-offs" and made clear that my affidavit still stood. The conversation then ended fairly abruptly and Frances and I have not spoken since.

88. Given my uncertain frame of mind, I was unsure about how to react. I was unaware of the existence of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 although, had I been able to articulate it in these terms, I would have said that, at that time, I had "blown the whistle".

Certification Officer's Report

89. On 21st July 1999, the Certification Officer released his report into the allegations made by John Chowcat. By this stage, because evidence of the defunct branch accounts appeared not to exist, I understand that John felt that he had no option but to withdraw those particular allegations (while maintaining the concerns I had raised to him over the abuse of expense procedures and unauthorised loans). The report produced by the Certification Officer made a number of conclusions. Importantly, this included the statement that, given the material the CO had seen, it was reasonable for John to have raised his concerns within the union.

90. However, it can be seen from the report that the CO was satisfied that the full investigation by Fishers had been thorough. I was concerned to read in the CO's statement that he had given both John Chowcat and myself an opportunity to clarify or to add to evidence already given to the union, but that neither of us had taken the opportunity to meet with him. I had two telephone conversations with Ron Dobson, who I understood to be an assistant to the CO. I explained to Mr Dobson that I was off sick, and felt unable to attend an interview at that time, but informed him that I understood that Joan Francis had also seen documents connected with the Guildhall account and that she had discussed its contents with NEC member Bob Braddock. I am not aware whether this additional information was investigated any further by the CO.

Fisher's Report

91. It is stated in the Fisher's report that they very much wanted to interview me as part of their investigation, but that I declined the opportunity. This suggests that I actively declined to meet with their investigators. This is incorrect. I was sent a letter on 19th March from Tony Ayres, containing only a small reference to a meeting with Fishers and making clear that it was not an instruction for me to attend. In my written reply to Mr Ayres, I emphasised that I was off sick but would meet with them when I returned. I heard nothing further from him on the subject. Apart from this small communication, I received neither a single letter nor a single telephone call from Fishers.

92. I strongly believe that the investigation should not have concluded without my input. From the above I can only assume that MSF must have (wrongly) informed Fishers that I had declined to co-operate with the investigation. I cannot understand how else Fishers could have (wrongly) concluded that I had so declined. Had it been a thorough and independent investigation, Fishers would have contacted me directly, and not through the offices of those being investigated.

93. The fact they did not, and were so apparently quick to make assumptions about me, questions the extent and independence of their investigation. I could have offered alternative information. Just one example relates to the content of a letter from UTB to Fishers dated 12th March 1999. The Bank states that they are not aware of any account where Mr Lyons or Mr Mendes had sole authority, and that two signatories are required on all head office and branch accounts. They say "we are not aware of any accounts in existence or having existed where sole signatories existed". I do not believe this is correct. Roger, Nelson and John were certainly sole authorised signatories on head office accounts, and Nelson would sign cheques in most cases.

94. Because John Chowcat withdrew his allegations about the Daxo and Guildhall accounts, I believe the investigation was half-hearted. The introduction to the report itself defines its purpose as investigating whether there was sufficient evidence to support the explanations provided to refute the allegations. That should not have been its true purpose. How else can Fishers explain away the fact that they did not examine the personal bank accounts of either Roger Lyons or Nelson Mendes, or were so ready to accept the evidence of UTB at face value and without further investigation, or were not prepared to speak with Joan Francis?

Investigation Meeting: 26th August 1999

95. Once the CO's report had been issued, it was quite apparent that MSF felt its position had been vindicated. But I still say that the unwarranted expense claims, the unauthorised interest-free loan and the excessive use of the credit card all speak for themselves. As for the defunct branch accounts, I would have 'accepted a proper explanation for what I had seen, but one was not given. MSF's denial of the existence of the Daxo and Guildhall accounts only added to my suspicions that Roger and Nelson were concealing evidence of wrongdoing.

96. I finally resolved to "come clean" about the full extent of my involvement in the leak of information to John Chowcat, at an investigation meeting held at the Raynes Park Office of MSF on 26th August 1999. It was too stressful to do otherwise. The meeting was chaired by Tony Ayres, with his secretary Joan Smith present to.take notes. I attended, accompanied by Colin Adkins. There are two sets of notes of that meeting: one prepared by MSF, one prepared by me.

97. I decided to prepare my own minutes, as I was concerned that the minutes prepared by MSF might not be accurate. Indeed, that has been shown to be the case. In the MSF minutes, for example, it is noted that I replied that I had not seen the actual bank accounts. This is not true: when Tony asked me to explain the basis of my belief in the existence of the cheques, I told him that I had seen copies of the cheques but that I believed another member of staff had seen an original. This seems to have found its way into Tony's minutes as me saying that someone else had seen the accounts. I asked Tony what he would do to look into the issue of this other staff member's involvement. He simply said that he was investigating the affidavit that I had submitted, and that this other staff member had not submitted an affidavit. That was where it was left.

98. I confirmed that my minutes of that meeting are an accurate recollection of what occurred. Looking back at events, I am now convinced that, at least from this moment onwards, MSF had already come to the decision to dismiss me and were determined not to take account of any comments to the contrary I might make. The fact that Tony was so dismissive of the possible relevance of the evidence from another staff member confirmed to me that they were interested only in finding a way to terminate my employment, not to understand why I had made the disclosure. No credence was ever given to the fact that all my other allegations of unauthorised loans, unwarranted expense claims and credit card abuse had been substantiated. As I mentioned above, even the CO confirmed that it had been reasonable for John Chowcat to raise his concerns within the union.

99. The correspondence that subsequently passed between MSF and I is self-explanatory. In particular, I would draw the Tribunal's attention to an e-mail I sent to Tony Ayres on 7th October 1999, in which I made clear that I would .continue to stand by what I had seen. I was also keen to resolve the whole issue. Weeks passed by and I heard nothing. Although I was sure I would face dismissal, there was no decision on that front. On numerous occasions, I chased Tony Ayres for a response. I felt like I had a sword hanging over my head. Eventually, following MSF's ongoing failure to reach any sort of decision, I decided to lodge a Tribunal application making further allegations, particularly under the new whistleblowing provisions.

Disciplinary hearing: 1st December 1999

100. Finally, a disciplinary hearing was arranged. I was notified of this by letter from Tony Ayres dated 16th November. It took place on lst December. I attended and was accompanied by Colin Adkins and Ed Blissett, the GMB's Regional Industrial Officer. Paul Talbot chaired the meeting, as acting AGS for MSF. Tony Ayres was also present and minutes were taken by Marie Griffins. I understand that minutes have now been produced by MSF. However, I have also prepared my own minutes, and I stand by their contents.

101. The meeting was very lengthy. Tony Ayres started by reading from what was obviously a prepared script. It was clear that Tony and Paul had already made up their minds to dismiss me, and were simply sticking to a pre-agreed form of words before announcing that conclusion. When the decision to dismiss was reached, I was told it was based on a number of factors. These included: my failure to expand on the affidavit, the failure to approach others who were more neutral about the information, the failure to participate in the investigations, their belief that I had acted maliciously, and bringing the union into disrepute. A subsequent confirming memo dated 2nd December was issued. Confirmation from Tony Ayres came in a formal letter of dismissal dated 3rd December.

 

 

102. I appealed against the decision within the specified time limits, but MSF has

refused to hear it. In a letter dated 15th March 2000 that I received from Tony Ayres, he stated that there would be "little point" in going through an appeal in view of my commencement of Tribunal proceedings.

Conclusions

103. For raising my concerns with John Chowcat, I have lost my job. John, the only proper person to whom I could have gone, has also lost his job. I have had nothing but misery, quite the opposite of the agenda MSF seem to believe I was pursuing. I am concerned for the jobs of the colleagues who remain behind. But I will stand by my allegation that Roger and Nelson were making unwarranted expense claims, and that Roger was benefiting from unauthorised loans and excessive spending on his credit card.

104. In the absence of an innocent explanation, I still believe that something very questionable was also happening to certain defunct branch accounts. MSF have not produced an innocent explanation. They have not suggested that I may have genuinely misunderstood the documents I saw. They have not suggested that I may have been honest but mistaken about the nature of what I saw and what it may have meant. All of these were possible, and remain possible. Instead, they simply say I am lying; that I saw nothing and made all this up to further my career. That is not the case. I saw what I saw.

105. They have come down on me like a ton of bricks; not only regarding the issue of defunct branch accounts, but also regarding the expense claims, the interest-free loans and the credit card use. I am therefore left assuming that there can be no innocent explanation; and that the genuine belief in such wrongdoing, that I held at the time of my disclosure, is actually right.

106. MSF made a determined effort to identify the source of the information to John and, once I told them it was me, they sacked me at the first opportunity. They now accuse me of perjury and even threaten me with a private prosecution. In all this, what hurts the most is that MSF has been at the forefront of campaigns to ensure protection for those who blow the whistle at work. But it is for this reason that I have lost my own job.

107. The contents of this witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

 

Signed: Marcia Solomon

Dated: 25th March

 

 

 

 

 

IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Case no: 2200894/1999

LONDON NORTH Case no: 2201572/1999

BETWEEN:

MS M C SOLOMON

Applicant

- and -

MANUFACTURING, SCIENCE & FINANCE

TRADE UNION

(MSF)Respondent

SUPPLEMENTARY WITNESS STATEMENT OF

MARCIA SOLOMON

I, MARCIA SOLOMON, will say as follows.

Introduction

This statement is prepared further to my first statement signed on 25 th March 2000. The purpose of this additional statement is to deal with matters of fact arising from the statements served by the witnesses for MSF: Tony Ayres, Nelson Mendes, Paul Talbot, Miles Webber, Laurie Bell and Stuart Burns.

In respect of the statements latterly provided by Laurie Bell and Stuart Burns, I comment with the leave of the Tribunal confirmed by its letter to my solicitors dated 17th May 2000. I am not commenting on the supplemental statements provided by Tony Ayres, Nelson Mendes and Paul Talbot.

I have limited my comments to areas of factual disagreement, and only insofar as these are not already apparent from my first statement. The fact that I do not respond in this supplemental statement to each and every comment in those statements (or, indeed, all of the statements) should not be taken as indicating that I agree with them.

I shall follow the same numbering for ease of reference.

On the statement provided by Tony Ayres

3. I did not approach Tony Ayres in January 1999 to ask him if I could work for someone other than Nelson Mendes. In December 1998 (I cannot recall the exact date), I had approached John Chowcat and asked him if I could transfer from the Finance Department into another department, as and when an opportunity arose. I believe it was John who then approached Tony to see if there was someone else for whom I could work.

Subsequently, in or around early February 1999, it was agreed that I would work for Chris Ball one day per week and Frances Richardson for the rest of the week. Having not discussed the matter with Tony at all, I am unable to ascertain how he can comment that "given the strength of [my] feeling ... it was entirely possible that [1] could have borne [Nelson] a grudge".

6. I was not re-interviewed. I was interviewed on only one occasion.

7. I was not re-interviewed a second time. As I said above, I was interviewed on only one occasion. This interview on 23rd February 1999 did not take place.

13. The implication here is that Tony Ayres was asking all the questions. My recollection is that Miles Webber conducted the meeting while Tony Ayres sat back quietly.

20. It was not my intention in swearing the affidavit to explain what I thought had

happened to the £130,000. The affidavit did raise questions; but these questions needed to be answered by a thorough independent investigation.

32. ii. I did not say that, on reflection, it was probably not the best thing for me to have gone to John Chowcat.

iv. I did not say that someone else had seen the accounts. I did say that I had only seen copies of the cheques; what I also said was that another member of staff had seen the original of the cheques. I was referring to Joan Francis, who I believe saw the original of the Guildhall cheque. I refer to my own minutes of this meeting.

v. I still decline to accept the outcome of the Fisher Report. I refer to the statement of Bartholomew Christopher Madge.

51 The fact that I had contact with John Chowcat should not be taken to imply that there was collusion between us. I was still an NJC rep, and in February 1999 1 was still dealing with John on GMB/APEX business. At that particular time, I was discussing with him turning one of MSF's office rooms into a multipurpose room where staff could receive first aid and pregnant women could have a tranquil location in which to rest.

On the statement provided by Nelson Mendes

4. This is only a small matter but Nelson refers to it as an "unsettling incident". In view of this, I will clarify the issue. I had explained to him that I thought it would be a good idea for him to stop using plastic cups for coffee from the vending machine. He would never put them in the bin, and would leave them scattered all over his desk. As a birthday present, I bought him a proper coffee machine for his office. I presented it to him at a surprise birthday party I had organised, along with a birthday cake baked by my mother. I also bought new cups and went to the supermarket every week to purchase fresh ground coffee for the percolator. These last items were paid for using office petty cash.

I said to Nelson at the time I bought the machine that I would only fill it up for him for a month or so. Thereafter, he should do it himself, once he knew how it worked (although I do not drink tea or coffee, I knew how to work the machine). He agreed to this. Subsequently, on the first occasion that I did not fill the machine for him, he confronted me over the issue in front of staff members. He told me that it was my place "as his secretary and as a woman" to make his coffee. I replied saying "that's sexist"; it was.

As for the comment about the union making a loss, I did not speak to Colin Adkins about this. Nelson had a habit of leaving his door open and speaking to numerous officers about the financial affairs of the union. If the information got out, it was probably because of this.

I did not bear a grudge against Nelson after I returned from my accident at work. My faith in him was certainly in question but, as his secretarial assistant, I still had to support him professionally. He would often speak to me about concerns he had over the manner in which he was being treated by John Gardener, Bob Braddock (both members of the NEC) and John Chowcat. At one stage, he told me that he was considering resigning, but I told him that he ought to stay. If I had borne a grudge against him, why would I have sought to persuade him not to leave?

I withdrew my allegation of racial discrimination against Nelson Mendes on receipt of legal advice that it was a claim that, while arguable, did not have adequate prospects of success. I accepted this advice because, at the time I lodged the complaint of racial discrimination (when I was acting in person and not receiving any advice at all), I was confused and under great strain. I saw it as a way of trying to defend and protect myself from the aggressive nature of the investigation, in a way, to try to "hit back".

As I said in my first statement, I had an uncertain frame of mind and was unsure about how to react. As I said in my Tribunal application, I only learned of the existence of

the Public Interest Disclosure Act when I took formal legal advice in August 1999. Thereafter I considered that a more appropriate way to express my concerns was in terms of having "blown the whistle". The fact that I later withdrew my allegation of racial discrimination - before the claim really got under way - should not, therefore, be taken as suggesting either that I had a grudge against Nelson or that I had acted unreasonably in bringing it in the first place.

On the statement provided by Laurie Bell

4. To the best of my, knowledge and belief, the documents I saw looked something like this:

 

 

(My scanner could not cope with this - HM)

 

 

I cannot recall the cheque numbers or dates. I could not read the scribbled signature. They looked to me like cheques, hence my assumption that they were. I do not know the colour of the cheques because they had been photocopied. The names and amounts had been written in hand. The part reading "in respect of MSF Guildhall" and "in respect of MSF Daxo" was in word-processed form, probably part of the pre-printed document. I am 99% sure that Roger's cheque was in respect of MSF Guildhall, and that Nelson's cheque was in respect of MSF Daxo.

On the further report provided by Stuart Burns

4.33 1 was off sick with stress at this time. I have no recollection of ever being told by Colin Adkins that Fishers would interview me "at [my] convenience". I do not therefore understand the basis on which Mr Burns can conclude that I was made aware of the possibility of providing representations to him directly and confidentially. I certainly received no communication from him, either orally or in writing.

4.36/9 In the grounds of resistance to my Tribunal application, their solicitors say: "The fraud allegations are untrue. She cannot have believed them to be true. The Accounts she described did not exist ... there is no. evidence that [they] have ever existed."

This was presumably written with knowledge that Joan Francis had spoken to Mr Bums and with knowledge of his conclusion that "it was possible for cheques to have been made payable to MSF Guildhall". As I state above, the documents I saw and assumed to be cheques had written on them "in respect of MSF Guildhall" and "in respect of MSF Daxo". MSF accuse me of peddling lies and peduring myself, yet only now acknowledge that they were aware of this information.

The contents of this second witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed: Marcia Solomon

Dates: 24th May 2000